



Palestine and Muslim Big Powers: What are the Major Determinants of Palestine Policy?

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Abstract

Despite ongoing bloody domestic battles, during the Medieval Era invading Holy Lands and controlling Palestine including territories of current Trans Jordan was a common policy of European big powers. That motivation so strong that the motto to retrieve Kudus and hold Holy Lands were the reason of first crusader in the year of 1096. Kudus was a kind of glue bringing enemies together and bringing never ending rivalries to a provisional end. During this era except a small period after the First Crusader, Muslims and in 1517 Ottoman Turks controlled the area almost all efforts of the European countries born fruitless. The age of Crusaders passed but the passion for Holy Lands never faded. After Thirty Year Wars formation process of nation states has been accelerated, while Ottoman Turks declining the rising European Big Powers by using newly invented industries in 1917 could have a strong hold on the Holy Lands and Palestine. Since that date onwards it has been Muslim Countries' turn to handle the struggle for the Holy Lands and Palestine nowadays such joint venture never come true. Medieval age and WWI were times of swords and cannons. The era after WWII, especially after the decisive victories of Israel has been transformed into negotiations and strong words mostly addressing internal policy. In this article Muslim Big Powers' strong discourse and sincerity disaccord will comparatively be analyzed.

Keywords: Palestine, Discourse, Sincerity, Muslim Big Powers

Jel Classification Codes: N45, F59

Filistin ve Müslüman Büyük Güçler: Filistin Politikalarının Ana Belirleyici Unsurları Nelerdir?

Öz

Ortaçağ'ın süregelen kanlı savaşlarına rağmen Kutsal Toprakları ele geçirmek, bugünkü Ürdün toprakları dahil Filistin'i kontrol etmek Avrupalı büyük devletlerin ortak politikasıydı. Bu arzu o kadar güçlüydü ki, Kutsal Toprakları geri almak ve Kudus'e sahip olmak 1096 senesindeki ilk Haçlı Seferi'nin dillerden düşmeyen sloganıydı. Kudus, düşmanları bir araya getiren bir tür tutkal, asla sona ermeyecek düşmanlıklara bir ara verdirebilen bir tür ara bulucuydu. Bu dönemde ilk Haçlı Seferi'nden kısa bir süre sonra istisna olmak üzere, Müslümanlar ve 1517 yılından itibaren Osmanlı Türkleri Kutsal Toprakları kontrol ettiğinden Avrupalı Devletlerin bütün çabaları sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Haçlı Seferleri dönemi geçmişte kalmasına rağmen Kutsal Topraklara yönelik arzu hiçbir şekilde sona ermedi. Otuz Yıl Savaşları sonrasında ulus devletlerin kurulma süreci hızlanırken, Osmanlı Devleti güç kaybetmeye başladı. Bu esnada Avrupalı Büyük Güçler yeni geliştirilmiş endüstriyel teknolojiler kullanarak 1917 yılında Kudus ve Filistin'i ele geçirebildiler. İşgal tarihinden günümüze Kutsal Topraklar ve Filistin için mücadele etme sırası Müslüman Devletlere geçti bu tür bir ortak aksiyon hiçbir zaman uygulamaya konulamadı. Orta Çağ ve I. Dünya Savaşı dönemi kılıç ve top devriydi. I. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönem, özellikle İsrail'in Araplara karşı kazandığı kesin zaferler barış süreçlerini ve sert söylemlere sıkışmış politikaları mecburi hale getirdi. Bu makalede Müslüman Büyük Güçlerin güçlü söylemleri ve samimiyet sorunları karşılaştırılmalı olarak değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Filistin, Söylem, Samimiyet, Müslüman Büyük Güçler

Jel Kodları: N45, F59

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1. Introduction

Palestine struggle is one of the unresolved problems of international politics.² There are numerous reasons of this process. The sincerity of Muslim countries is one of that obstacles. In Medieval ages there were two Muslim big powers; Ottoman Turks and Savafid Iran. After the catastrophic results of WWI and collapse of Ottoman Empire by the beginning of decolonization in 1946, akin post-Westphalian Europe the number of Muslim big powers increased to five. Considering level of development, economic power, geographic location, stability and political capability those are namely: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Indonesia. Pakistan also could be added to this list yet it has some definite structural problems. Especially after the foundation of Israel in 1948, Muslim Big Powers together with new dynamics and post-colonial period expectations started to repeat European Big Powers' Medieval policies to re-conquer the Holy Lands, if this is not possible at least to have a strong hold on Palestine. But the struggle faced with some grave differences such as; during Medieval era the Holy Lands were a glue for Christian nation building efforts vice versa in modern era it became a vital friction keystone for Muslim Big Powers.

In addition do Arab Countries change their policy towards Palestine Question at the cost of worsening their relations with US, i.e., they minimize their confrontation to Israel. Actually their main policy during last decade is to pretend that they are strongly supporting Palestine question actually that was not the case. Especially during the last years most of them developed strong relations with Israel behind closed doors. On the other hand Turkey, using a hard discourse towards Israel and supporting Palestinians unconditionally, some people argue that it is because that policy rise JDP (Justice and Development Party) votes. According to opposing groups actually, Turkey only uses a strong discourse and some assistance programs.

One step forward to force Israel to make concession for Palestine alone could not be Turkey's policy. Apart from Turkey oil rich big country Iran pretends confronting Israel strongly but its basic aim is to keep its autocracy up and it is clear that Iran reluctant to put one step forward to force Israel for concession(s). It could be argued that, differing from Medieval European Big Powers, none of those Muslim Big Powers sincerely in favor of a forced solution because all use the case for their political selfish power struggle. Among Muslim Big Powers Turkey has a special position. It has the strongest army power, state construction, despite periodical fluctuations a working democracy and secular social structure. During the last decade especially after the power shift in Turkish policy from secularist elites, the balanced foreign policy has been

² See Harms, G., & Ferry, T. (2017). *Palestine*, In the Palestine-Israel Conflict - Fourth Edition: A Basic Introduction (pp. 57-64); see Haddad Toufic, "Palestine." *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, edited by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis; London, 2013, pp. 282-307; Karsh Efraim, "The Scramble for Palestine." In *Palestine Betrayed*, 190-209. Yale University Press, 2010; Ismail Kse "The Lloyd George Government of the UK: Balfour Declaration the Promise for a National Home to Jews (1916-1920)", *Belleten*, Vol. LXXXII, No:294 (August 2018). pp. 727-754.

put aside and the tone of critical even aggressive discourse had a sharp rise against Israel and its policies in Palestine.

The aim of this paper is to unearth Muslim big power policies towards Palestine in general and towards Holy Lands in particular. At what level it is a connective leverage for joint policies; do Muslim big powers really want to liberate Palestine or do they only use it for their selfish domestic and external political interests and more ridiculously does any of them volunteer under favorable conditions to confront Israel militarily.

2. Turkey's Strong Discourse for Palestine Since 1946 Onwards


Many of the patterns found in both Turkish rhetoric and Turkish actions since the foundation of Israel echo those of both the internal politics and external acceptance. There are arguments that domestic policies mostly shaped by worries to poll conservative voters' support.³ This is an important fracture point because demographically Turkish population is not homogeneous in which percentage of conservative nationalist voters sometime reaches to almost the half of national average. There are sharp changes in Turkish political life soon after Cold War during last two decades. After the proclamation of Republic until 1950 there were a single party patronage system to ensure implementation of modernization reforms. Democrat Party (DP) two years after the foundation of Israel came to power by May 14, 1950 elections due conservative, urban votes. When DP came to power, Turkey one year ago had recognized Israel and developed high levelled diplomatic relations with this newly established country.

When DP rule started, the tradition in Turkish political life using a hard discourse favoring Palestine Struggle to ensure conservative, urban votes took a sharp start. After this date more or less all political parties but mostly conservative rightist and extremist leftist parties from marginal right to marginal left noticing this reality mostly preferred this way of policy making meanwhile almost all of them developed strong economic and after 1990's even militaristic relations towards Israel. During its close relations with Turkey Israel strategically and militarily gained important advantage and even that relationship empowered Israel's existence in that turbulent geography. Although implementation of good relations, there has been balanced critics on excessive use of power and ignorance of international legitimacy especially rejection of UN resolutions condemning Israeli policies. Nevertheless, until 1990's political parties in Turkish political life considering preservation of founding secular structure preferred to use religious references as less as possible in state administration.

In Turkish political life two parties having strong Islamic tendencies came to power. One of them was Welfare Party (WP) established by the late Necmettin Erbakan soon after the 1971 Semi-Coup and the second as a natural out runner of it, Justice and Development Party (JDP) founded in 2001 August, after turbulent years of so called 28 February 1998 post-modern coup

³ İsmail Köse, "Turkey's New Foreign Policy Concept: The Challenges, Advantages & Disadvantages Tested by Mavi Marmara Take-Over Raid", *Codrul Cosminului*, Vol: XXIV, No. 2 (December 2018). pp. 409-430.

era. So called Islamist Welfare Party after long struggle, came to power in 1998 and same year accused threatening secular lifestyle toppled by the joint cooperation of Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and secular elitist bureaucracy. Interestingly this post-modern coup paved the way of an unexpected trigger effect. As domino stones moved by secular bureaucracy and TAF that unpredicted process cleared the path of another movement from same roots akin almost having the same traditions.⁴ Therefore second wave of Islamic movement came when JDP seized power in 2002 November elections and that movement still rules the country.



In Turkish political life, especially after the start of multi-party system in 1945, parties could keep power not more than maximum 10 years. Unlike this unofficial long-lasting tradition JDP came to power at the end of 2002 and without any interruption since then almost two decades it has been ruling the country. There are several factors assisted ideological parties sharing same preferences such as JDP to keep power. In some points similar to and in some points different from their counterparts akin all around the world ruling parties to keep power in Turkey have to implement successfully some basic policies. Those are respectively: (1) a growing economy, because Turkey has a young population, the share of 0-14 age group in national total is 22.6% and 15-64 age group is 67.2%. In addition the country has been receiving rising numbers irregular migration a growing economy is vital for voters.⁵ (2) Strong combat with terrorism and perseverance of public order and security (3) Protection of democracy and secular state structure (4) Strong Islamist discourse and political stance also important for voters' political choices. As it is seen economy as a social infrastructure factor always shape social superstructure behaviors occupy priority in voters' preferences. As a developing country having young population economical indicators are more and more effective in Turkey than developed European countries.

⁴ *Cumhuriyet [The Republic]*, "Muhtıra gibi Tavsiye [Recommendation as much as strong as Military Memorandum]", 1 March 1997. p. 1, 4.

⁵ *Turkish Statistical Institute*, "Population Projections in Turkey 2018-2080", <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=30567> (accessed July 15, 2020).

As it is mentioned above in political science, economy is the infrastructure of societies, i.e., regardless religion, culture or nationality or other social factors, economic conditions mostly steer social behaviors. Proving this universal motto, all around the world in general and in Turkey in particular economic development and rise of votes has strong correlation. That is why, while income levels rising votes also rose and when income levels started to decrease voting rates also starts to go down.

Same happened to JDP, when it seized power there were economic crisis in Turkey. Until the year of 2009 the country had a fast economic growth rates same as votes of the JDP also had a sharp rise as it is figured out in Graphic-I. Economical indicators and voting rate lines paralleling each other upgraded and downgraded together. The sharp rise of GNP during the first years of JDP rule and rise of voting levels are seen in Graphic-I also. As it is very well seen the vertical rise of GNP line contributed almost same vertical rise of voting rates.⁶ It is said that those were the heydays of JDP rule yet because lack of needed investment at economy and education serious economic problems started to emerge.

When economic indicators begun to get worsen ruling parties need new leverages to attract voters' preferences. As it has been experienced in the past all around the world that the only way to bring down worsening economic life standards is to use of religion and nationalism. To hide their incompetence combating Covid-19 Crisis Donald Trump and almost all other leaders all around the world put in use almost same instruments.⁷ Experiences throughout history prove that those two items when used timely always make benefit for power fonding rulers.


To prove that analyze it is argued that during the rise of economic figures and voting rates, remarkably despite its strong Islamic roots, JDP preferred a low level soft criticism addressing Israel. Even sometime Israel's use of excessive force and illicitly committed acts in Palestine ignored by Turkish Governments. That policy could be implemented while economy had been growing. When economic indicators started to get worse and the vertical line begun to down day by day new assertive policies needed to keep power.

Bringing an end to heydays of its rule the first sharp economic shock as it is figured out at Graphic-II came in the year of 2009. Interestingly same year, soon after the one minute crisis in Davos JDP's use of hard discourse against Israel has been accelerated and fueled.⁸ Till that date some serious crisis had been faced with but non-had caused a break up between two countries.

⁶ *Republic of Turkey Supreme Election Council*, <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/milletvekili-genel-secim-arsivi/2644>; <https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/en/tcmb+en> (accessed April 10, 2020).


⁷ Matt Flegenheimer, "What Democracy Scholars Thought of Trump's Bible Photo Op", *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/us/politics/trump-holds-bible-photo.html> (accessed June 16, 2020).

⁸ <https://t24.com.tr/haber/mahfi-egilmez-yazdi-turkiye-ekonomisinin-son-17-yili,854564> (accessed March 25, 2020).



The new hard criticism and aggressive discourse were not a policy put into practice coincidentally. Because its leadership were very well aware of the fact that worsening economy inevitably would mean loose of ruling majority. Non the less, economic development depended on several factors such as democratization, qualified education, competitive market, high-tech products so on, it was almost impossible betterment in economy near future. It is argued that the need for a new leverage to keep majority votes up, preserve ongoing ruling status and most importantly to save sustainability of conservative voters' coercion, JDP resolutely started to use a strong discourse against Israel. The new tone has been so high that sometime stronger and harder than Arabs even Palestinians themselves.⁹

Ball-out fluctuation in Graphic-I and Graphic-III indicates the fact that same as parallel to economic decrease there is fluctuation in Turkish domestic policy.¹⁰ Betterment of economic figures as mentioned above needed long-run strongly backed policies. If a government did not have so long time span to consolidate its voters' loyalty not to lose power it needs some other strong arguments.



⁹ TBMM [Turkish Grand National Assembly] Minutes, 09/07/2014.

¹⁰ <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/milletekili-genel-secim-arsivi/2644> (accessed March 25, 2020).

Since 1950's it has been seen that conservative urban voters always ready to be led by strong conservative policies. Thus a reasonable strong, aggressive, hard discourse in Palestine struggle may be helpful. When traditional Turkish Foreign Policy considered it is seen that regardless ideological preferences of ruling political parties criticizing Israel's excessive acts and brutal policies in Palestine were a traditional state policy. Meanwhile not to intervene disputes among Arab countries and conservation of neutrality also have been traditional foreign policy of Turkey. Thus aggressive, hard discourse was a sharp shift from that long-run institutionalized state policy. Actually that policy even more and more harder than previous experiences was convenient with traditional rightist discourse.

Until it has approaching a strong, even harder discourse and a balance lacked policy even more aggressive than Palestinians themselves towards Israel was the policy tracked by only rightist conservative or leftist extremist parties. Due unconditional support of voters which seconded by strong leadership, charismatic myth of the leader contributed practice of that sharp shift. It is impossible to determine what was the prediction when that policy put in use but the result together with other developments most probably much better than expectations. As it is figured out in Graphic-I, despite continuing economic problems and no sharp recovery chance in the near future, the poll-out graphic line splitting its traditional movement instead of decrease turned up. Thus ruling parties could keep office and continue to rule the country. Because it is seen that aggressive discourse against Israel assist consolidation of votes, the tone of hard policies such as diplomatic criticism, break up of relations also probable.

3. Reasons and Results of Arab Countries' Downgrading Discourse and Lessened hostility Against Israel

Arab countries are mostly oil rich autocratic states. Nation building process and secularization as a two basic necessity for nation building were unsuccessful and people mostly afraid of hard punishment prefer not to criticize ongoing tradition. Arab-Israeli wars proved that Arab countries under existing conditions could not defeat a nation state army. Contrary to nation state armies, soldiers and generals in Arab countries are not loyal to nation their loyalty unconditionally should address dynasties. So Arab leaderships have to be protected from their own nations and from any external threat. Because their armies are insufficient they need an external power to be supported by. It was UK until WWII provided needed support. Nowadays no surprise it was London agitated Arab nationalist against Ottoman Turks in 1916s.¹¹

After WWII, Britain and other colonial powers had lost necessary power to continue to run their colonial assets. De-colonization process became effective in Arab countries and new hegemonic power US replaced UK and other colonial actors. Same era overlaps with the foundation of Israel Arab dictators paradoxically while struggling against Israel which was a

¹¹ *The Arab Bulletin*, No. 1, Savoy Hotel, Cairo, June 6, 1916.

argued that it is a client state of US, meanwhile they needed US support to keep up their existence.

Another problem of Arab dictatorships was to eliminate rising protests from the streets. At this point hard discourse against Israel became a life vest for those antidemocratic leaderships. How much they criticize Israel and escalate hostile discourse against demonized enemy Israel they could silence the streets. Israel together with several factors became one of the basic legitimization leverages for oppressive Arab administrations. The biggest of Arab countries Saudi Arabi is one of the oppressive autocratic countries using this rhetoric and hard discourse for selfish interests. Not surprisingly after the visit of Donald Trump Saudi King Salman in May 2017 Riyadh gradually started to soften its policy towards Israel.¹²

4. Reasons and Results of Iran's Never Combatting Routine Policy

Because Iran is not a full democratic country, voting rates and economic indicators do not give any solid argument about Iran's discourse on Palestine. Meanwhile Iran's use of Palestine struggle is also similar to other big power actors.¹³ Iran, a country akin Wahhabi Saudi Arabia a sectarian country leads Shia school of Islam all around the world as strong foreign policy tool. Thus, Iran foments conflict from Balkans to Arabian Peninsula provide support to radical organizations such as Hezbollah to keep international pressure far from mainland. Beside international pressure, Iran has more dramatic domestic problems the last Mahsa Amini protests are one of forerunner of those social tiredness. The Shia Theocratic Quintet rule limits basic freedoms of people in the name of religious rhetoric.

As it is seen the sectarian policies no more capable to run Iran's theocratic rule, Iran the only country in the Middle East in which common protests could start from streets and easily could infiltrate onto high classes of society needs an external enemy. This enemy should be sustainable, could legitimate Quintet Velayet-i Fakif (Guardianship of Iran Shia Islamic Jurist) oppressive rule and keeping hostilities ongoing hard discourse could be addressed to this enemy.¹⁴ As it is clearly seen Israel is an ideally suited actor meeting all those necessities. The question how much Iran sincere during its combat and hostilities against Israel actually takes same answer of Saudi Arabia.

Iran, has been using a hard discourse and accusing Israel places special emphasis on Palestine since Islamic Revolution in 1979. Cevat Zarif, the Foreign Minister of Iran in convenience with traditional Iranian foreign policy at every opportunity blames Israel arguing that the country committing criminal policies and practices against Palestinians, occupying Palestinian soils. He also says that those who support and enable the Israeli regime to commit that crimes have also

¹² *The Guardian*, "Trump joins ceremonial sword dance in Saudi Arabia by King", May 21, 2017.

¹³ Trita Parsi, "Israel and the Origins of Iran's Arab Option: Dissection of a Strategy Misunderstood." *Middle East Journal*, vol. 60, no. 3, 2006, pp. 493-512.

¹⁴ Milani, Mohsen M. "Tehran's Take: Understanding Iran's U.S. Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 4, 2009, pp. 46-62.

the Palestinians' blood on their hands.¹⁵ Same as Iranian high officials interruptedly use a critical, offensive discourse against Israel, even they always confess that Israel is the biggest enemy of Iran. But all reluctant to confront Israel militarily. So that during 2010s Iran developed the idea that a referendum should be hold in Palestine (including Israeli lands) for the destiny of people. No doubt Iran knows that majority of population is Arab but the reality also known by Iranian leadership that Israel never will accept such a proposal.¹⁶

The actual invisible aim was to outmaneuver Arab countries and showing the public that Iran regime supporting Palestine struggle, producing new alternatives to solve the problem. If this propaganda could be successful it would provide double folded benefit to Iran: (1) Iran through this way could persuade Shia people living in Arab countries that it has been handling Muslim worlds' problems. It is very well-known fact that relations between Arab countries and Iran are not very well. Even both sides condemn other with apostasy. Thus, Iran could destabilize Arab countries when threatened by them (2) because Iran's theocratic regime cannot provide its people wealth, freedom and progress it needs to persuade its people that it is the leader of Islamic world and the regime is the best to defend Muslim rights. Iran a few years ago, in 2011 had blamed Arabs not to support Palestinians and Turkey having diplomatic relations with Israel: "... sincerity of the Muslim governments in their support for the Palestinian people is to cut evident and covert political and economic relations with that regime. Governments that host Zionist embassies or economic offices cannot claim to defend Palestine, and no anti-Zionist slogans will be taken seriously".¹⁷ This statement clearly shows what Iran intends actually and how leadership competition fierce and a compromise almost impossible among Muslim big powers.

Founder of Iran Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, almost every occasion had been stating that; "*the disappearance of Israel from the world [sine qua non rule of peace]*", and "*Israel must be destroyed*". Ayatollah Ali Khamenei softening this discourse in 2019 stated that he did not consider Israel's disappearance as a Jewish state disappearance [from the earth]". Khamenei before this statement several times he had referred Israel as a "*fake Zionist regime*" and said that: "*the disappearance of Israel means the destruction of the Zionist regime and the imposed regime of Israel*".¹⁸ Neither Turkey nor Saudi Arabia, Iraq or Egypt during last decades had used so hard discourse as to destructing or razing out a country addressing Israel.

As it is clearly seen differing from Turkey and Arab countries Iran was and is the country using the mostly hard discourse against Israel and waging a proxy war against Israel throughout Hezbollah militants. Khamenei, in July 2019 during his meeting with high-ranking delegate of Hamas said that: "*Palestinian case the first and foremost issue in the Muslim world. ... Not many years*

¹⁵ *Speech by Dr. Zarif in the Meeting of the NAM Ministerial Committee on Palestine in Baku*, <https://en.mfa.ir/portal/NewsView/35977> (accessed in May 17, 2020).

¹⁶ <http://qodsna.com/fa/328514> (accessed 13 March 2019).

¹⁷ <http://qodsna.com/fa/328514> (accessed 13 March 2019).

¹⁸ آیت‌الله خامنه‌ای: محو اسرائیل، محو یهودیان نیست [Ayatullah Hamaney: Mehu Israil mahu Yahudiyan Nist], <https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-50421480> (accessed November 15, 2019).

ago, the Palestinians fought against the stone, but today they are equipped with rockets, instead of stone, which means a sense of progress".¹⁹ This assertive speech address Katyusha, WS-1B and Grad rockets in use against Israel since 2001. Three years ago during a speech in 2016 at Imam Hussein's Guard and Officer Training University using force against Israel and fighting against Israel had been advised with strong words supported by Verses from the Holy Koran.²⁰

Khamenei, one month before his reception of Hamas leaders had accused Bahrain and Saudi Arabs betraying Palestine Struggle: "*Bahrain holds a summit on the US mandate against the Palestinian issue, to destroy the Palestinian issue! Bahraini rulers know they are emptying under their feet; not fooling the Saudi*".²¹ Beside its Palestine policy this rhetoric is another Iranian diplomacy to cover its insincerity through accusing the rest. Iran by this way legitimize its theocratic masquerading democracy and awakens oppressed Shia population in Arab countries.

Despite its traditional offensive policy, Iran's hard discourse against Israel also fluctuating. No doubt, developments in the Middle East and world politics, international relations affect closely Iran's policy and discourse towards Israel. Nevertheless, akin other Arab countries, questions such as: "how much this policy sincere" and "does this policy really want to confront Israel militarily" receive same answer. Iran argues that, it accepts the cost of defending Palestinians rights. Actually this is not the total case. Definitely Iran, supports Palestinian Struggle yet it uses this issue to handle its oversea political aims and legitimate its internal oppressive rule. Needles to increase high ranking leaders' anti-Israeli discourse because in general lines together with different wording or words almost the tradition is the same during the last four decades onwards.

5. Conclusion

Creating an external enemy and fueling hatred is a commonly used method of totalitarian states to keep masses silent. Even Turkey, a democratic country the rightist political parties, mostly use hard discourse addressing voters' loyalty. All of those countries and Islamic rightist parties in Turkey do not fond of Israel but non alone or jointly volunteer to confront Israel militarily. Instead of that, they all prefer to use a hard discourse against Israel by this legitimization they could keep their rule ongoing.

During Medieval era there were almost a homogenous religious unity in Central Europe. Orthodox understanding of Christianity had been represented in Eastern Balkans and Levant. But after Martin Luther in 1517, European Unity has been broken yet especially after the peace of Westphalia (1648) and Seven Years Wars between UK and France (1756-1763) nation states had been established in Europe. That process gradually accelerated nation building and

¹⁹ خامنه‌ای: فلسطینی‌ها امروز بجای سنگ مجهز به موشک‌های نقطه زن هستند <https://farsi.alarabiya.net/fa/iran/2019/07/22> (accessed July 22, 2019).

²⁰ *Statements at Imam Hussein's Guard and Officer Training University*, Monday, May 23, 2016, <http://qodsna.com/fa/328514>; <https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/NewsPDF/Arabic/Nile.pdf> (accessed June 12, 2019).

²¹ <http://qodsna.com/fa/328514> (accessed July 9, 2019).

secularization all around the Europe put religious differences aside. In addition to scientific developments, Renaissance and Reforms, Industrial Revolution was the last step brought superiority to Europe. How this happened is clear: Science, rationalism, secularization and nation states. The inevitable result was seizure of Palestine in 1917 which during Crusaders, even joint, homogenous European Kingdoms such as Britain, France, Austria, Hungary, Germans during the first two crusades Byzantine could not have sustainable success to handle Palestine.

The history of Muslim world as a monotheist religion similar to development of Christianity. Yet, differing from Christianity breakup in Islamic understanding and sectorization started early dates of Islam about 19 years after the death of Prophet. After the assassination of 4th Caliph Ali in 661, Islamic world firstly divided into two and later many fragments were born in those turbulent days. Umayyads, Abbasids, Seljuks and Ottoman Turks were the powers keep Palestine lands under Islamic Rule. Because nation building process together with secularization and industrialization were not completed or realized in Islamic geographies and interstate jealousies and sectarian conflicts unlike medieval or Modern Europe there is no any possibility for a joint, more importantly sincere combat for Palestine struggle. Instead knowing their disability to bend Western powers leaders in the Middle East use Palestine struggle to keep their autocratic rule ongoing and pretend as to defending Palestinians rights, even fierce insincere competition to use a hard discourse against Israel always in use. That policies may disturb Israel but never could persuade Tel-Aviv not to use brutal policies against Palestinians or invade Palestinian territories.

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