Abstract
“Bilen varlık” ve “eyleyen varlık” olmak üzere iki tip özne tanımı olduğun söyleyebiliriz. Saf “eyleyen varlık” anlamıyla hukukun öznesi yalnızca asli kurucu iktidar olabilir. Bütün diğer hukuk özneleri “hukuku bilip ona göre eylemek” kapasitesine sahip olmaları gerektiği için aynı anda hem bilen hem eyleyen özne olmak durumundadır. Gerçek kişilerden bağımsız bir bilme ve eyleme kapasitesi olamayacağı için tüzel kişilerin ayrı birer hukuk öznesi olarak kabul edilmesi için bir sebep bulunmamaktadır. Hayvanların hukukun öznesi olup olamayacağı tamamen onların bilişsel kapasitesiyle ilgilidir. Bu anlamda, insan dışındaki çoğu canlı varlık hukukun öznesi olamaz. Yapay zekâ dışındaki cansız varlıkların da yine bilişsel kapasite eksikliği dolayısıyla hukukun öznesi olamayacağını söyleyebiliriz. Haklar açısından ise durum farklı olacaktır. Hak normları genellikle hak sahibi dışındakilere yükümlülük yükleyen normlar olarak anlaşılabilir. Bir başka deyişle, her hak tanıyan normu yükümlülük yükleyen bir norm olarak ve eksiksiz biçimde yeniden ifade edebiliriz. Bundan ötürü, hak sahibi olacak olan varlığın hukuku bilme veya hukuka göre eyleme kapasitesine sahip olması hak normlarının deontik yapısı nedeniyle şart değildir. Bu durumda, hukukun öznesi olamayacağına hükmettiğimiz cansız varlıkların ve hayvanların hak sahibi olabileceklerini söyleyebiliriz.
Keywords
References
- Alexy R, The Argument From Unjustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, Oxford University Press, 2004. Audi R, Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision, Routledge, 2006.
- Austin J, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 2. Baskı, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Burdeau G, L’État, Seuil, 1970.
- Celenmajer D ve Lefebvre A, “Introduction: Bringing the Subject of Human Rights into Focus”, in The Subject of Human Rights, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, s. 1-25.
- Çataloluk G, “Hukuk Çalışmaya Devam Etmeli Miyiz? Sistemik Bir Analiz”, Hukuk Kuramı, 5 (1), 2018, s. 1-24.
- Duguit L, Kamu Hukuku Dersleri, AÜHF Yayınları, 1954.
- Goodale M, “The Misbegotten Monad: Anthropology, Human Rights, Belonging”, in The Subject of Human Rights, Stanford University Press, 2020, s. 48-63.
- Gözler K, “Yorum İlkeleri”, in Anayasa Hukukunda Yorum ve Norm Somutlaştırması, KHP-TBB, 2013, s. 15-119.
- Gülgeç Y B, “Interrelationship Between Validity, Efficacy and Coerciveness”, Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 66 (4), 2017, s. 677-729.
- Gülgeç Y B, Normativite ve Pozitivizm, On İki Levha, 2020.
- Hart H L A, The Concept of Law, 3. Baskı, Clarendon, 2012.
- Hohfeld W N, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”, The Yale Law Journal, 23 (1), 1913, s. 16-59.
- Kelsen H, Pure Theory of Law, 5. Baskı, The Lawbook Exchange, 2009.
- Lee P, “The Basis for Being a Subject of Rights: The Natural Law Position”, in Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis, Oxford University Press, 2013, s. 236-248.
- MacCormick N, “Why Law Makes No Claims”, in Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy, 2007, s. 59-67.
- Pennachin C ve Goertzel B, “Contemporary Approaches to Artificial General Intelligence”, in Artificial General Intelligence, Springer, 2007, s. 1-30.
- Rand A, Atlas Vazgeçti, 3. Cilt, Pegasus, 2021.
- Raz J, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Raz J, Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Raz J, “The Identity of Legal Systems”, California Law Review, 59 (3), 1971, s. 795-815.
- Schauer F, “Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law”, Ratio Juris, 23 (1), 2010, s. 1-18.
- Shapiro S J, “What is the Rule of Recognition (And Does It Exist?), in The Rule of Recognition in the U.S. Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2009, s. 235-268.
- Şimşek E, Hukuk Öznesi Olarak Sivil Toplum, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2020.
- Teubner G, “Rights of Non-Humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Actors in Politics and Law”, Journal of Law and Society, 33 (4), 2006, s. 497-521.
Abstract
There are two types of subjects: the “knowing entity” and the “acting entity”. The subject of law in its meaning as the pure “acting entity” can only be the primary constituent power. All other subjects of law must be simultaneously the knowing and the acting subject because they must possess the capacity to know and act according to the law. Whether animals could qualify as subjects of law depends entirely upon their cognitive capacities. It is obvious that living creatures other than human beings will likely fail to qualify as subjects of law. Similarly, inanimate entities other than artificial intelligence would also fail to qualify as subjects of law due to their lack of cognitive capacities. However, the situation is different with respect to rights. Right norms can generally be understood as norms obligating those other than the right holder. In other words, each right norm could be perfectly re-expressed as an obligating norm. Therefore, due to the deontic structure of right norms, the right holders do not have to possess the capacity to know and act according to the law. Consequently, those entities that cannot qualify as subjects of law can perfectly be designated as right holders.
References
- Alexy R, The Argument From Unjustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, Oxford University Press, 2004. Audi R, Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision, Routledge, 2006.
- Austin J, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 2. Baskı, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Burdeau G, L’État, Seuil, 1970.
- Celenmajer D ve Lefebvre A, “Introduction: Bringing the Subject of Human Rights into Focus”, in The Subject of Human Rights, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, s. 1-25.
- Çataloluk G, “Hukuk Çalışmaya Devam Etmeli Miyiz? Sistemik Bir Analiz”, Hukuk Kuramı, 5 (1), 2018, s. 1-24.
- Duguit L, Kamu Hukuku Dersleri, AÜHF Yayınları, 1954.
- Goodale M, “The Misbegotten Monad: Anthropology, Human Rights, Belonging”, in The Subject of Human Rights, Stanford University Press, 2020, s. 48-63.
- Gözler K, “Yorum İlkeleri”, in Anayasa Hukukunda Yorum ve Norm Somutlaştırması, KHP-TBB, 2013, s. 15-119.
- Gülgeç Y B, “Interrelationship Between Validity, Efficacy and Coerciveness”, Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 66 (4), 2017, s. 677-729.
- Gülgeç Y B, Normativite ve Pozitivizm, On İki Levha, 2020.
- Hart H L A, The Concept of Law, 3. Baskı, Clarendon, 2012.
- Hohfeld W N, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”, The Yale Law Journal, 23 (1), 1913, s. 16-59.
- Kelsen H, Pure Theory of Law, 5. Baskı, The Lawbook Exchange, 2009.
- Lee P, “The Basis for Being a Subject of Rights: The Natural Law Position”, in Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis, Oxford University Press, 2013, s. 236-248.
- MacCormick N, “Why Law Makes No Claims”, in Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy, 2007, s. 59-67.
- Pennachin C ve Goertzel B, “Contemporary Approaches to Artificial General Intelligence”, in Artificial General Intelligence, Springer, 2007, s. 1-30.
- Rand A, Atlas Vazgeçti, 3. Cilt, Pegasus, 2021.
- Raz J, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Raz J, Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Raz J, “The Identity of Legal Systems”, California Law Review, 59 (3), 1971, s. 795-815.
- Schauer F, “Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law”, Ratio Juris, 23 (1), 2010, s. 1-18.
- Shapiro S J, “What is the Rule of Recognition (And Does It Exist?), in The Rule of Recognition in the U.S. Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2009, s. 235-268.
- Şimşek E, Hukuk Öznesi Olarak Sivil Toplum, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2020.
- Teubner G, “Rights of Non-Humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Actors in Politics and Law”, Journal of Law and Society, 33 (4), 2006, s. 497-521.
Details
| Primary Language | Turkish |
|---|---|
| Subjects | Legal Theory, Jurisprudence and Legal Interpretation |
| Journal Section | KAMU HUKUKU |
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | April 18, 2024 |
| Submission Date | January 20, 2024 |
| Acceptance Date | March 3, 2024 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2024 Volume: 28 Issue: 2 |